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Evidence from a Chinese Textile Firm
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Using data on team assignment and weekly output for all weavers in an urban Chinese textile 
firm between April 2003 and March 2004, this paper studies a) how randomly assigned 
teammates affect an individual worker’s behavior under a tournament-style incentive scheme, 
and b) how such effects interact with exogenously formed social networks in the 
manufacturing workplace. First, we find that a worker’s performance improves when the 
average ability of her teammates increases. Second, we exploit the exogenous variations in 
workers’ origins in the presence of the well-documented social divide between urban resident 
workers and rural migrant workers in large urban Chinese firms, and show that the coworker 
effects are only present if the teammates are of a different origin. In other words, workers do 
not act on pecuniary incentives to outperform teammates who are from the same social 
network. Our results point to the important role of group identities in overcoming self-interests 
and facilitating altruistic behavior. 
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Competition, Group Identity, and Social Networks in the Workplace: 
Evidence from a Chinese Textile Firm 
 
What happens within the firm used to be a black box for mainstream labor economists 
(Gibbons, 1997). In the last two decades or so, diverse attempts have been made to expand its 
traditional scope of inquiry to include institutions and activities inside the firm. On the one hand, 
the literature on promotion tournament (pioneered by Lazear and Rosen, 1981) has provided new 
insight on the nature and scope of competition among coworkers within the firm, facilitated by 
promotion tournament. On the other hand, the growing literature on economics of human 
resource management practices has been focusing on coworker cooperation (for instance, 
knowledge sharing and peer monitoring), and the effects on such coworker cooperation of 
various human resource management practices (see Ichniowski and Shaw, 2008 for a most recent 
review). In this paper we join forces in such efforts to open the black box of the firm by shedding 
new light on the potentially important role that group identity may play in promoting (or limiting) 
coworker cooperation and competition in the workplace.  
Specifically, using weekly data for defect rates (proportion of defective output) for all 
weavers in a Chinese textile firm during a 12 months (April 2003-March 2004) period, this paper 
provides evidence on the presence and nature of coworker effects (individual worker behaviors 
influenced by the teammates' behaviors or characteristics) in the manufacturing workplace.
1
                                                        
1 Notable recent studies on such coworker effects are either laboratory experimental studies (e.g., Falk 
and Ichino, 2006) or econometric case studies of workers in the non-manufacturing workplace. For example, 
Mas and Moretti (2009) use individual productivity data on supermarket cashiers at a large supermarket chain 
in California and provide direct evidence on performance spillovers though peer pressure. Bandiera, Barankay 
and Rasul (2010) use individual productivity data on fruit pickers at a leading U.K. agriculture firm and show 
that workers tend to conform to their friend’s productivity level. Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) 
exploit random groupings of professional golfers and test the presence of coworker effects in professional golf 
tournaments. Unlike the first two studies, they find no evidence for coworker effects. 
 First, 
we find that a worker increases her effort level and improves her performance when working 
with more able teammates. Second, by exploiting the well-documented fact that an exogenously-2 
 
formed deep divide between urban resident workers and rural migrant workers exists in firms in 
Chinese cities, we find novel evidence on the interplay between social networks (urban resident 
group and rural migrant group) and the coworker effects --- a worker puts in more effort when 
working with more able outgroup teammates but not when working with more able ingroup 
teammates.  
Economists have been increasingly aware of the potentially important behavioral effects 
of group identities (see for example Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and have started to contribute 
fresh evidence to an already rich body of evidence accumulated by psychologists.
2
                                                        
2 For a succinct literature review including both social psychology and economics, see for instance 
Chen and Li (2009; section 1).   
 Most of the 
evidence is from experiments in laboratory settings, and field evidence from the actual 
workplace is rare. For instance, Chen and Li (2009) first induced group identities to their 
subjects in laboratory settings and let them play a series of two-person sequential games. The 
interplay between group identities and outcomes from such games indicates that group identities 
indeed facilitate altruistic behaviors by subjects. Our weavers display similar group identity-
induced altruistic behaviors in the actual workplace when competing with their teammates in the 
presence of relative performance-based incentives (pecuniary incentives to outperform their 
teammates in the form of wage increase and prize). Specifically our weavers are found to not act 
on such incentives to outperform their teammates insofar as the source of the rising average 
ability of her teammates (and hence increased coworker competition) is the presence of more 
able ingroup teammates. In other words, our weavers appear to be willing to let their teammates 
win the prize and earn higher wages insofar as they belong to the group with which they strongly 
identify. Such altruistic behaviors do not arise, however, if the rising average ability of their 
teammates comes from more able outgroup teammates.  In short, we interpret our finding 
(significant coworker effects arise across the social network yet not within) as evidence from the 3 
 
actual workplace on the important role that group identities play in overcoming self-interests and 
facilitating altruistic behaviors in the presence of pecuniary incentives to outperform teammates.  
 
I. Data and Setting 
The Chinese textile firm in our case study, SCT, is based in Shijiazhuang, an industrial 
city and the capital of Hebei province in the northeastern China.
3
In collaboration with Xiao-Yuan Dong and Derek C. Jones, we collected several kinds of 
data from the case.
 Textile is one of the city's most 
prosperous industries. SCT was founded in 1921, originally as a state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
However, like many other large SOEs, SCT suffered from the financial crisis during the 1990's 
due to outdated facilities, an aging workforce, and shrinking market. In 1998 the firm was one of 
the first large-scale SOEs to be privatized. The ownership and management restructure saved the 
firm from the threat of bankruptcy. SCT employed about 3,500 workers during our study period. 
4
The detailed personnel data with which SCT generously provided us include personal 
characteristics, weekly performance measures and wage for all of its weavers in the weaving 
division over the 53-week span between March 2003 and April 2004. An advantage of this 
 These were collected during a lengthy study period, highlighted by two 
separate site visits with extensive interviews with the Director of Human Resources, the Director 
of the Weaving Division, a line supervisor and two team leaders at the Weaving Division, and the 
Director of Data Management (who was in charge of all internal data). In addition, to get 
perspective from an outsider, the site visit was supplemented by an extensive interview with a 
long-term consultant for SCT who has been observing the firm for many years. As well as 
collecting various performance and personnel data, we also deepened our knowledge of the case 
by collecting data from a survey that we designed and administered to all team leaders. 
                                                        
 
3 Our confidentiality agreement with SCT prohibits us from revealing the actual name of the firm. 
4 See Dong, Jones and Kato, 2007 for details on the data.   4 
 
"insider" dataset is that the individual performance measures are recorded by machines and thus 
measured with little errors. For the purpose of this study, we dropped 12 weavers who have 
worked for only 1 week as well as 115 observations where the weaver worked for less than 2 
days of the week, for we have too little data to accurately predict abilities for these weavers. 
They are also unlikely to receive or cause any coworker effects with such short presence in the 
team. The resulting dataset has 9966 observations for 287 individual weavers.
5
A quick glance at the workplace gives observers a first impression that the role of 
weavers in the production process is rather limited since the operation appears to be fully 
automated. Cloths are produced by automated looms rather than weavers. However, a longer and 
closer observation of the workplace reveals that automated loom machines are far from perfect 
and that problems do occur from time to time (such as broken threads).
 Table 1 provides 
the summary statistics of their personal characteristics. All but 9 weavers are female. They all 
have graduated from junior high school but not high school. About 67% of them are rural 
migrant workers, while the rest are urban resident workers. 
6
For example, “good weavers” will detect early signs of problems and make timely 
adjustments to the operation process so that problems will not fully materialize and hence no 
defective product will result. Should problems actually turn up, “good weavers” will solve them 
 Each weaver's main task 
is to pay close attention to her assigned loom machines (multiple loom machines are assigned to 
each weaver) and minimize the occurrence of such operational problems; and if problems arise, 
solve the problems quickly and effectively. 
                                                        
5 In addition, one outlier observation was dropped, where its defect rate was above 10% (the 
maximum in the rest of data is 2.5%) and its daily output was only 5 meters (the mean in the rest is around 500 
meters). 
6 Integrating careful field research into standard econometric analyses is a key element of “insider 
econometrics” (Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2004). For a compelling demonstration of the value of 
conducting careful field research before embarking on quantitative research, see Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi (1997).    5 
 
in a timely and effective manner so that defective output will be minimized. Due to the problem 
solving nature of their main task, SCT constantly tells their weavers how important quality is, 
and asks them to work toward "zero defect". 
For each weaver in each week, the firm keeps three performance-related records: total 
output produced, days worked, and defective output produced. From these three variables, we 
calculated the following two performance measures:
7
The nature of weaving technology and the problem-solving nature of a weaver’s job at 
SCT as described above suggests that the key individual performance variable for weavers at 
SCT is DefRateit (quality), and while their discretionary efforts matter significantly for DefRateit, 
there appears to be little room for discretion in terms of pace of production (or DayOutit). All 
weavers are required to fulfill planned output levels and they appear to do so on most occasions.
 
Defect Rate (quality measure) of weaver i in week t:  
(1) DefRateit = {(Defective Outputit)/(Total Outputit)}×100; 
Average Daily Nondefective Output (quantity measure) of weaver i in week t:  
(2) DayOutit = {(Total Outputit - Defective Outputit)/(Days Workedit×10)}. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the performance measures. The mean of Days Workedit 
is 6.3 days (a day is counted as an 8-hour work period, so it's possible for the maximal Days 
Workedit to exceed 7). The mean of DayOutit is around 545 meters with standard deviation of 
roughly 180 meters. The mean of DefRateit is approximately 0.24% with standard deviation of 
0.18%. Although "zero defect" is emphasized in the workplace, there doesn't exist a week where 
zero defect rate is actually achieved. 
8
                                                        
7 The variables are scaled so that the regression coefficients are more readable: daily output is 
measured in 10 meters and defect rate is out of 100. 
  
 
8 Based on demand for its output, at the beginning of each week, SCT comes up with the upcoming 
week’s detailed production plan with specific numbers for planned output, days worked, and defective output 
assigned to each individual weaver. The correlation between the planned and actual daily output is 0.9562 6 
 
In other words, on the one hand, DayOutit is largely determined by the plan, and there 
will be very little if any room for weavers to have behavioral response to coworker effects. Our 
wage regressions reported later also confirm that there is no monetary incentive to produce more 
than planned. Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to identify any coworker effects when 
the output of the whole team is influenced by some aggregate demand shocks.  
On the other hand, the weavers have considerable discretion and monetary incentive to 
minimize defective output, and hence behavioral responses to coworker effects in the quality 
measure are clearly plausible. Therefore, our investigation of coworker effects will focus on 
defect rate as our key performance measure although we will pay appropriate attention to the 
quantity of output.  
It is still possible, however, that aggregate demand shocks could affect actual defect rate. 
Using the planned performance measures as a control for demand, reassuringly our regressions 
show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the actual defect rate and 
demand shocks. These results will be discussed in more details in the next section. 
  SCT uses a standard three-shift operation and each shift has six teams based on the 
location of the weaving rooms. Thus, there are a total number of eighteen teams. As shown in 
Table 1, the average team size is around 10.5 with a standard deviation of 2.5. The weavers do 
not switch teams, but the composition of each team changes from week to week due to employee 
turnover and temporary absence. Our field research indicates that the firm does not use any 
systematic rule (explicit or implicit) on team assignment of new workers (such as assigning more 
able workers to teams which face more demanding assignments.) We will also confirm the 
suggested lack of systematic team assignment rules econometrically by testing the random team 
assignment hypothesis with the quantitative data below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
whereas the correlation between the planned and actual defect rate is only 0.0957. 7 
 
Assuming that changes in team composition are not correlated with the error terms, we 
have an exogenous source of variation that can be used to test whether a weaver puts in more 
effort and improves her performance when she is working with more able peers. While working 
alongside her teammates, the weaver is responsible for her own output. There is no team 
production at the weaving section of SCT, and no externality is generated by the production 
technology. Moreover, on-the-job interactions among weavers are extremely limited by the 
working environment, because 1) each weaver is required to pay undivided attention to her 
machines and 2) the machines are loud and the weavers are wearing masks. Thus, any coworker 
effects could only come from either offline interactions or the simple presence of the teammates, 
or both. 
SCT requires each of the 18 teams to hold team meetings during the meal break, once or 
twice a month to discuss issues concerning quality and exchange each other's experience of 
dealing with problems arising from production. Each team is also encouraged to hold "voluntary" 
team meetings after work as well. According to our own survey of all team leaders, nearly all 
teams meet once a week (four times a month). The average team meeting lasts about an hour. In 
addition, each team is required to hold a training session and skill contest after work at least once 
a week. The purpose of such sessions is to help each other enhance skill level. Finally, each team 
selects a model worker during one of their team meetings. The company provides select model 
workers with bonuses and paid vacations. For example, during 2002 just before our data 
collection began, about 40 model workers were selected and awarded with a trip to Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, staying at 3-star hotels. Through various team activities described above, 
each weaver becomes clearly aware of her performance relative to her teammates.   
In the context of an urban Chinese enterprise, there is a powerful social divide between 
urban resident workers and rural migrant workers. The relaxation of the regulations on rural-8 
 
urban migration in 1988 encouraged many rural workers to look for a job in the urban areas and 
get paid higher than what they earn from doing agricultural work at home. However, it is not 
easy for rural migrant workers to gain an urban housing registration ("hu kou"), which serves as 
a considerable entry barrier to the buoyant urban labor market for rural migrants, and causes 
inequality between the rural and urban labor force. Without urban housing registration, rural 
workers are ineligible for many high-paying urban jobs as well as the urban welfare programs 
such as healthcare and schooling (Huang, 2001). A rural worker must also pay for a temporary 
residence permit in order to find a legal residence in the urban areas. There is significant 
adjustment cost for a rural migrant to work in the urban area, which does not incur for an urban 
worker. The sharp distinction between the urban and rural status tends to create powerful group 
identities among rural migrant workers as well as among urban workers.  
Our informant (HR director) confirms that social interactions happen differently for the 
rural and urban workers at SCT. The rural workers are mostly young single women from rural 
villages of Hebei Province. All of them live in the company dormitory free of charge (5 or 6 per 
room). After work they return to the same dorm, eat dinner in the same dining hall, and often 
socialize amongst themselves. It is thus highly likely that they create strong bonds among 
themselves, not only because they can relate more easily to each other, but also because they 
spend much more time together than with the urban workers. Since the rural workers form their 
own community, an urban worker will find it easier to be friends with other urban workers than 
breaking into the network of rural workers. Urban workers also prefer to communicate among 
themselves due to the commonality of their backgrounds (Nielsen, et. al., 2006 and Lu and Song, 
2006). 
While confirming that weekly wage for weavers are tied to their performance and days 
worked for the week, our informant does not mention that SCT has any explicit relative 9 
 
performance pay scheme. Nonetheless, the existence of skill contests and competition for model 
workers point to the presence of a tournament-style incentive for workers to outperform other 
workers, however small the size of the incentive may be. To explore any possible implicit 
incentive in wage payment for a weaver to outperform her teammates, we run a wage regression 
with two dummy variables indicating whether or not the weaver outperforms her teammate’s 
average performance in DefRateit and DayOutit as additional explanatory variables 
(Outperforming Teammates' Avg DefRateit and Outperforming Teammates' Avg DayOutit). As 
shown in Table 2, the fixed effect estimates of the wage equation first confirm our qualitative 
evidence from field research that individual wages are indeed related to own individual 
performance (DefRateit and DayOutit) as well as days worked in a week (Days Workedit). Most 
importantly, however, the estimated coefficient on the outperformance dummy variable in 
DefRateit is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting an implicit pecuniary 
incentive for a weaver to outperform her teammates in DefRate. Although such reward may not 
be written explicitly in the wage contract, coworker effects would arise if the weavers are aware 
of the implicit competition.
9
To study the nature of competition and cooperation among teammates at SCT, we draw 
on an empirical strategy used by a number of recent studies to estimate coworker effects in the 
workplace (see, for instance, Mas and Moretti, 2009, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010, and 
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2009).
 
 
II. Estimating coworker effects 
10
                                                        
9 To be consistent with the findings from our field research, there is no such incentive in DayOut. For 
more information on wage determination at SCT, see Dong, Jones and Kato (2007).  
 Consider the following production function: 
10 Pioneering works using internal personnel data in economic research include Medoff and Abraham 
(1980), and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b). More recently, a number of studies (e.g., Lazear, 
2000, Kleiner and Helper, 2003, Fernie and Metcalf, 1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, Knez and Simester, 2001, 10 
 
(3)   oit = f(ai, eit, εit) 
where oit is the performance measure of weaver i in week t, ai is her innate, time-invariant ability,  
eit is her effort in week t, and εit is the error term. Weaver i’s performance is determined by her 
innate time-invariant ability, her time-varying effort, and other time-varying random factors. 
Coworker effects are present if a weaver's effort is influenced by either the average effort of her 
teammates (how hard her teammates are working) or the average ability of her teammates (how 
capable her teammates are). We call the former "contemporaneous coworker effects" and the 
latter "compositional coworker effects". The contemporaneous effects are hard to identify due to 
the paucity of persuasive ways to separate εit from eit. Our observed correlation between oit and  
ō-it (teammates' average performance excluding weaver i) could be due to correlation among the 
noises (for example, due to an aggregate demand shock.) Furthermore, regressing ō-it on oit 
suffers from the "reflection problem" (Manski 2003) where the direction of causality cannot be 
identified. Thus, the satisfactory identification of the "contemporaneous effects" requires an 
instrument that influences the coworkers' average performance while not affecting one's own 
performance. By definition, however, such an instrument does not exist, for every worker is a 
coworker of her colleagues at the same time.  
The second type of coworker effects arises when changes in ā-it (her teammates’ average 
innate ability excluding weaver i) caused by changes in her team composition will bring about 
changes in eit (her own effort level). Such compositional coworker effects do not suffer the same 
econometric problems since neither the error term nor the worker's effort at time t should 
influence the innate ability of the coworkers. This is the approach taken by the aforementioned 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005, and Shi, 2011), use such “insider” data and study the effects on 
individual worker performance of a change in pay methods (e.g., the switch from time rates to piece rates or to 
performance pay). A related line of work examines the effects on individual worker performance of the shift to 
team-based production (e.g. Batt, 1999, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2002, and Jones and Kato, 2011). 
None of these studies examine coworker effects and performance spillovers.  11 
 
recent studies and is also used in this paper.  
There are a number of possible reasons why such compositional coworker effects may 
arise at SCT. Perhaps the most obvious reason is the presence of explicit and implicit incentives 
for weavers to outperform their coworkers at SCT (implicit relative performance incentive and 
model worker contest as described in some detail in the previous section). Second, as discussed 
in Mas and Moretti (2009), compositional coworker effects may arise from pro-social 
preferences and social pressure (disutility from behaving non-cooperatively and being viewed as 
behaving non-cooperatively by coworkers). Unlike in the case of supermarket cashiers in Mas 
and Moretti (2009), however, there is no obvious negative externality of underperformance in 
our case. Recall that there is no team production at SCT and that workers do not interact with 
their teammates while operating machines. As such, producing defective output from her 
assigned machines will make her teammates’ work no more difficult. As such, lagging behind 
itself does not constitute “behaving selfishly”. In this sense, our weavers are similar to fruit 
pickers in Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010). Nonetheless, unlike Bandiera, Barankay and 
Rasul (2010)’s fruit pickers, there is some externality through compensation schemes at SCT. 
Specifically, by lagging behind a weaver actually helps her coworkers earn more money through 
implicit relative performance incentive and increase their chances of winning the model worker 
contest. In other words, catching up with your coworkers can be viewed as “behaving selfishly” 
at SCT.  
Third, it is certainly possible that coworker effects stem from knowledge sharing among 
coworkers. For instance, the newly-arrived “superstar” worker comes up with a new and better 
solution to a quality problem. Provided that she shares such a new and better solution with her 
coworkers, her coworkers will improve their performance. As discussed below, however, our 
results on interplay between group identities and coworker effects turn out to be inconsistent 12 
 
with knowledge sharing as a primary source of the coworker effect at SCT.  
To estimate such compositional coworker effects successfully, we need to use a 
comprehensive set of covariates and predict with precision the true innate time-invariant ability 
of each individual weaver, ai. To this end, we estimate the following equation with an extensive 
list of covariates:  
(4)  DefRateit = α + ai + λMit + γ Cjt + βDayOutit + εit 
where Mit is a set of 287 coworker dummy variables controlling for the presence of coworkers. 
For instance, the dummy variable "coworker1" in week t takes a value of 1 if weaver i works 
with weaver 1 in week t in the same team, zero otherwise. Cjt is the set of additional controls 
including week fixed effects and week times team fixed effects. DayOutit is included so that we 
can measure each weaver’s ability to maintain high quality of the output, holding the quantity of 
the output constant. To see if endogeneity of DayOutit is a problem, we used planned DayOutit as 
an instrument for actual DayOutit. Reassuringly the results changes little in general and Hausman 
test cannot reject the null that the IV estimate of β is not different from the OLS estimate of β. As 
such, we do not believe endogeneity poses any serious problem.
11
  As we argued before, DayOutit is mostly demand-determined and individual weavers 
appear to have little room for discretionary effort to influence it. Hence, predicted innate ability 
differences in DayOutit are expected to be of less consequence for our analysis. However, we 
also estimated a similar equation to predict the true innate time-invariant ability of each 
  
We exclude planned DefRateit from the right-hand side of Eq. (4), for we are not 
measuring the ability to outperform the plan. If high ability performers also get more demanding 
assignments, then controlling for planned performance would underestimate the spread in ability. 
                                                        
11 As discussed earlier, we focus on DefRate as the only relevant performance measure for weavers at 
SCT. However, we also considered DayOut as an additional performance measures. As expected, considering 
DayOut as an additional performance measure was found to yield similar results. These as well as all other 
unreported results are available upon request from the authors.   13 
 
individual weaver in DayOutit as well. As expected, all of our results are insensitive to the 
inclusion of predicted innate ability of each individual weaver in DayOutit.     
Before turning to our main task of estimating coworker effects, we first need to check 
whether the abilities of the team members at a given time are correlated with each other. If they 
are, then our ability to identify the coworker effects will be constrained considerably. 
Reassuringly our field research at SCT points to the absence of any rule (written or unwritten) of 
assigning the weaver to different teams based on her ability. To confirm the absence of such 
systematic assignment rule at SCT, we further test the random assignment hypothesis statistically. 
As shown in Appendix, the random assignment test turned out to support our field observation 
that there is random assignment. 
We are now ready to specify our first-difference model which is used to estimate 
coworker effects:  
(5) ∆DefRateit = θΔa -it + κΔDayOutit + additional controls + ∆εit 
where Δ indicates the first difference between week t and t-1. a -it is the average ability of weaver 
i’s  teammates who are working with her in the same team in week t. Specifically,  
a -it = (� ak )
𝑚𝑚
𝑘𝑘≠𝑖𝑖 /m 
where m is the total number of weaver i’ teammates who work with her in the same team in week 
t.   
The value of θ measures the compositional coworker effects. DayOutit is included to 
control for pace of production and hence possible quantity-quality tradeoff (in theory a weaver 
can lower DefRate by simply slowing down her pace of production). To make sure that the 
estimated coefficient on Δa -it is capturing the pure compositional coworker effect, we include a 
variety of additional controls. First, we include a set of variables controlling for demand, which 14 
 
include: Days workedit, planned DefRateit and the total number of weavers working in the same 
team in week t. Planned DayOutit is excluded in equation because it is highly collinear with 
actual daily output, DayOutit. Second, we include constant (to capture a firm-wide time trend), 
individual fixed effects (to capture individual-specific time trends), month fixed effects and/or 
week fixed effects (to capture firm-wide time-specific effects), and month*team fixed effects (to 
capture team-specific time effects). Third, the positive compositional coworker effect (θ>0) 
means that when a weaver is working with more able teammates, she will put in more effort and 
improve her performance. However, for the same reason, her teammates also put in more effort 
and improve their performance. In other words, the positive compositional coworker effect will 
likely accompany an increase in average effort of her teammates which may cause her effort to 
rise and hence improve her performance through the contemporaneous coworker effect. As such, 
unless we control for average effort of her teammates, our estimates will be subject to omitted 
variable bias. To address this problem, we add Δe -it as an additional control variable where e -it is 
average effort of weaver i’s teammates in week t (the effort level of each teammate, weaver k, is 
calculated by subtracting her estimated ability, ak from her DefRatekt).   
The first difference model is preferred to the fixed-effect level model, for as discussed 
above, we cannot separate the underlying team fixed effects from the individual predicted 
abilities. Thus, in the level model, team fixed effects will show up on both sides of the equation 
causing spurious correlations. 
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of Eq. (5). We begin with presenting a parsimonious 
specification with no demand control in column (1). In column (2), we then add demand control 
and see if the results change. Column (3) presents an even less parsimonious specification with 
demand control and more detailed weekly time effects (instead of monthly time effects). Finally, 
in column (4) we further add team-specific time effects (Month*Team fixed effects) and explore 15 
 
the impact of such team-specific time effects on the coworker effect estimates.    
For all four specifications, the estimates of θ (the effect of the change in teammates' 
average ability in defect rate on the change in the focal weaver's defect rate) are positive and 
statistically significant or close to being significant (t=1.59, 1.40, 1.97, and 2.13), pointing to the 
presence of coworker effects at SCT.
12
The nature and direction of such interplay between social networks/group identities and 
the coworker effect will vary, depending on the sources of the coworker effect. The possible 
interplay between social networks and contagious enthusiasm/role model is rather intuitive and 
straightforward. The coworker effect through contagious enthusiasm/role model is more likely to 
 The size of the estimated coworker effect appears to be 
plausible and economically meaningful. When the average innate ability of her teammates to 
control quality improves by 0.1 percentage point (or a 0.1 percentage point decrease in DefRateit) 
as a result of team compositional changes, the weaver’s own defect rate will fall by 0.03 
percentage points, ceteris paribus.  
Finally, as expected, we find no evidence for the quality-quantity tradeoff (weavers 
reducing defect rate by simply slowing down the production pace). The estimated coefficients on 
DayOutit are small and in fact negative rather than positive.  
 
III. Coworker effects and Group Identity 
The most novel aspect of our data is the coexistence of the two distinct social networks in 
the workplace with strong group identities: Rural migrant network and urban resident network. 
We now explore how the presence of strong social networks (rural vs. urban) at SCT may be 
interacting with the observed coworker effect.  
                                                        
12 We followed Mas and Moretti (2009) and adjusted standard errors to take into account the sampling 
variability of the estimated fixed effects for coworkers, ak. It turned out standard errors changed very little 
when we applied this adjustment.     
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arise within the social network rather than across the social network. Again consider the arrival 
of the “superstar” worker to the team. The coworker effect through contagious enthusiasm/role 
model arises when an incumbent team member will be inspired by the arrival of the “superstar” 
worker and perhaps even start emulating her as a role model, resulting in better performance for 
herself. When the “superstar” worker is an ingroup worker as opposed to an outgroup worker, the 
incumbent team member is more likely to be inspired by her and try to emulate her as a role 
model.
13
In stark contrast, the coworker effects arising from competitive spirits and incentive are 
likely to be stronger across the social network as opposed to within the network. As discussed 
earlier, when a weaver finds herself competing with more able weavers in the workplace, she 
increases her effort and improve her own performance to satisfy her competitive spirit. We argue 
that in general her competitive spirit will be more acutely awaken when the increase in the 
  
Likewise, the coworker effects stemming from knowledge sharing among teammates are 
also more likely to arise within the social network rather than across the network. First, as 
explained in Section II, there is little pecuniary incentive to share knowledge with teammates (in 
fact there are explicit and implicit incentives for a weaver to outperform her teammates and 
hence not to share knowledge) and as shown in the recent experimental literature on group 
identify and altruistic behavior, group identity helps workers overcome their self-interests and 
engage in knowledge sharing among workers within the social network. Second, the cost of 
knowledge sharing tends to be lower among workers within the same social network than across 
the network (e.g., rural migrant workers are from the same rural region and speak the same 
dialect, and literally eat and sleep in the same dorm). 
                                                        
13 The positive effects on student outcomes of having teachers of the same gender or race as role 
models are reported in the economics of education literature (see, for instance, Rask and Bailey, 2002; Dee, 
2004; Bettinger and Long, 2005 for recent evidence).     17 
 
average ability of her teammates originates in her outgroup teammates (such as the arrival of the 
“superstar” worker who belongs to the other social network). In addition, the nature of group 
identity and social networks generated by the powerful divide between rural migrant and urban 
workers in Chinese factories makes the aforementioned competitive spirit story particularly 
relevant and compelling at SCT.   
As discussed earlier, the deep rural/urban social divide causes weavers to form powerful 
group identity and a pervasive mentality of “us against them”, resulting in informal yet vigorous 
intergroup competition within the team. In this context of intergroup competition, the arrival of 
new and able weaver from the other social network is viewed as a threat to the supremacy of her 
group over the other group (or the group’s plan to establish its supremacy without delay).
14
When the increase in the average ability of her teammates comes from the rising average 
ability of ingroup teammates (e.g., the arrival of the “superstar” worker who belongs to her own 
social network), however, the aforementioned social pressure and collective competitive spirit 
are largely irrelevant. In fact, our weavers may display similar group identity-induced altruistic 
behaviors to what the recent experimental literature on group identity reports, when competing 
with their teammates in the presence of pecuniary incentives to outperform their teammates. 
Specifically, when competing with more able teammates, the weaver is less likely to win skill 
 
Social pressure to respond strongly to such a threat to the status of the social network will be 
evoked. As discussed and supported by evidence in Mas and Moretti (2009), such social pressure 
prompts a weaver competing with more able outgroup teammates to exert herself more to satisfy 
her group’s collective competitive spirit. The failure to do so may result in shame, reputational 
loss, and social sanctions.  
                                                        
14 The relationship between inter-group competition and intra-group cooperation has been studied in 
experimental economics (see, for instance, Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel, 2002, Tan and Bolle, 2007, and 
Reuben and Tyran, 2009). 18 
 
contest and model worker competition, and hence prizes, and her wage will be more likely to be 
lower since she is less likely to outperform the average performance of her teammates (as shown 
in our wage regression results). As such, there is an tournament-style incentive for her to respond 
to the rising ability of her teammates by putting in more effort and enhance her performance. 
However, she will not act on this incentive insofar as the source of the rising average ability of 
her teammates is the presence of more able ingroup teammates. In other words, a weaver may be 
willing to let her teammates win the prize and earn higher wages insofar as they belong to the 
group with which she strongly identifies. Such altruistic behaviors do not arise if the rising 
average ability of her teammates comes from more able outgroup teammates.     
To explore the interplay between coworker effects and social networks, we modify Eq. (5) 
to allow for the interaction between coworker effects and social networks: 
(6) ∆DefRateijt = θ1Δa -igt + θ2Δa -i-gt + κΔDayOutit + additional controls + ∆εit 
where g denotes person i's social network, a -igt is the average ability of weaver i’s  ingroup 
teammates who are working with her in the same team in week t AND belong to the same social 
network. Likewise, a -i-gt is the average ability of weaver i’s outgroup teammates who are 
working with her in the same team in week t AND do not belong to the same social network. We 
use the same set of control variables as in Eq. (5) except that our demand control includes the 
size of the rural and urban networks in the team separately (instead of controlling for the total 
team size).  
  The OLS estimates of Eq. (5) are presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficients on the 
average ability of outgroup teammates are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, whereas the estimated coefficients on ingroup teammates are considerably smaller (one 
third to one half of those on the average ability of outgroup teammates) and not significant even 19 
 
at the 10 percent level.
15
In contrast, the estimated coefficients on the average ability of her ingroup teammates 
(rural) are not significant and relatively small (especially when team-specific time effects are 
controlled for). In short, for the average rural migrant worker, changes in the average ability of 
her ingroup (rural) teammates are found to have little impact on her own effort, whereas she is 
found to put in more effort and improve her performance in output quality when the average 
ability of her outgroup (urban) teammates increases. The magnitude of such intergroup coworker 
 Again, the size of the estimated coworker effect from outgroup 
teammates is plausible and economically meaningful: when the average innate ability in quality 
control of her outgroup teammates improves by 0.1 percentage point (or a 0.1 percentage point 
decrease in DefRateit) as a result of team compositional changes, the weaver’s own defect rate 
will fall by close to 0.03 percentage points, ceteris paribus. In short, we find evidence that the 
coworker effect exists across the network yet not within.  
The regression results in Table 4 also suggest that our coworker effect estimates are 
unlikely to be driven by common noise that affect all teammates, for otherwise θ1and θ2 should 
both be significant for both groups of workers who work in the same team.  
  Finally, we further explore whether such a coworker effect across the network is stronger 
among rural migrant workers than among urban resident workers. To this end, we divide the data 
into two subsamples, the rural migrant worker sample and the urban resident worker sample, and 
estimate Eq (6) for those two subsamples separately. Tables 5 and 6 present the results. For the 
rural migrant sample, as shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficients on the average ability of her 
outgroup teammates (or urban teammates) are positive and significant at the 1 percent level in 
the most parsimonious specification, and still significant at the 10 percent level even in the least 
parsimonious specification with team-specific time effects controlled for.   
                                                        
15 The differences in the estimated coefficients between outgroup and ingroup are statistically 
significant or close to being statistically significant.  20 
 
effects appears to be again sensible and economically meaningful. For instance, as her outgroup 
(urban) teammates’ average ability in quality control improves by 0.1 percentage point (or a 0.1 
percentage point drop in DefRateit), the average rural migrant weaver will put in more effort and 
improve her own defect rate by 0.02 percentage points.  
The results for the urban resident worker sample are similar to those for the rural migrant 
worker sample although they are somewhat less significant. The estimated coefficients on the 
average ability of the urban worker’s outgroup teammates (rural) are positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level with team-specific time effects controlled for and close to being significant 
without team-specific time effects but with demand control (t=1.58 and 1.62). When demand 
control is not included, as shown in column (12), the estimated coworker effect is less significant 
(t=31). The estimated coefficients on the average ability of her ingroup teammates (urban) are, 
however, much smaller and not at all significant. As such, similar to the case of rural workers, on 
the one hand, an urban weaver is found to change her effort level very little in response to a 
change in her ingroup (urban) teammates’ average ability. On the other hand, she is found to put 
in more effort and lower her own defect rate by 0.03 to 0.04 percentage points when her 
outgroup (rural) teammates’ average ability rises by 0.1 percentage point.
16
In sum, we find that the coworker effects arise amongst weavers across the social 
network rather than within the network. It follows that the coworker effects at SCT are likely to 
be driven by each weaver’s competitive spirit in general and her collective competitive spirit in 
the presence of intergroup competition, combined with social pressure (shame, social sanctions 
and reputational damages), in particular. In contrast, the lack of significant coworker effects 
within the network suggests that contagious enthusiasm/role model and knowledge sharing may 
    
                                                        
 
16 Unfortunately the differences in the coworker effects between ingroup and outgroup are no longer 
statistically significant once we slice the data into the two subsamples (rural and urban) and hence the data for 
each regression are considerably thinner.  21 
 
be of less relevant at SCT.   
 
V. Conclusions 
Using weekly data for defect rates (proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a 
Chinese textile firm during a 12 months (April 2003-March 2004) period, this paper has 
provided some of the first rigorous evidence on the presence and nature of coworker effects in 
the manufacturing workplace. As in the case of U.S. supermarket cashiers studied by Mas and 
Moretti (2009), the coworker effects we detected for Chinese weavers are driven probably 
neither by knowledge sharing nor by contagious enthusiasm/role model, for if knowledge sharing 
and contagious enthusiasm/role model were key drivers of the coworker effect, we should have 
found more significant coworker effects within the social network rather than across the social 
network (and we have found the opposite pattern). However, unlike Mas and Moretti (2009)’s 
cashiers, our weavers do not impose any direct negative externality on their teammates by 
underperforming. In fact, there are explicit and implicit tournament-style incentives for them to 
outperform their teammates (or positive externality imposed on their teammates by 
underperforming). Hence social pressure (e.g., shame, reputational damage and social sanctions) 
to minimize negative externality imposed on her teammates by her own underperformance 
(which turned out to be the primary source of the coworker effects among cashiers in Mas and 
Moretti, 2009) is of less relevance to our weavers.  
Instead we believe that strong group identity and intergroup competition have much to do 
with the coworker effect that we have observed. In the context of the pervasive divide between 
rural migrant workers and urban resident workers in the manufacturing workplace in Chinese 
cities, each weaver’s competitive spirit is more powerfully awaken when the increase in the 
average ability of her teammates stems from the rising ability of her outgroup teammates as 22 
 
opposed to her ingroup teammates. The increase in the average ability of the worker’s outgroup 
teammates is regarded as a threat to her group’s relative standing against the other group. Hence 
there is social pressure for her (and all other ingroup teammates) to counter such a rise in the 
average ability of her outgroup teammates by putting in more effort and improving her 
performance.  
Such competitive behavior is further amplified by the presence of explicit and implicit 
pecuniary incentive for each weaver to outperform her teammates. The rising average ability of 
the worker’s ingroup teammates may stimulate her individual competitive spirit (which is also 
consistent with the presence of the aforementioned tournament-style incentives) yet such 
individual competitive spirit appears to pale compared to collective competitive spirit (or 
collective social pressure on each teammate to counter the rise in the average ability of her 
outgroup teammates).    
A recent study of fruit pickers in the U.K. (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010) reports 
stronger coworker effects within the network than across the network. Group identity of their 
fruit pickers appears to be largely personal and certainly not based on deep-rooted social and 
historical institutions (such as rural migrant versus urban resident workers in our case), it is quite 
possible that intergroup competition (the “us versus them” mentality) which prevails between 
rural migrant and urban resident workers in the workplace in Chinese factories may not be as 
pervasive among those fruit pickers. Such lack of powerful intergroup competition among fruit 
pickers may account for their contrasting finding.    
The recent experimental economics literature on group identity reports evidence on the 
significant role of group identities in overcoming self-interests and facilitating altruistic 
behaviors. Our workers are found to be willing to let their teammates win the prize and earn 
higher wages insofar as they belong to the group with which they strongly identify. Such 23 
 
altruistic behaviors are found to be missing when the rising average ability of their teammates 
comes from more able outgroup teammates. As such, this paper has presented some of the first 
field evidence from the actual workplace on the role of group identities in promoting altruistic 
behaviors.      
Lastly, our finding on the presence of strong inter-group competition implies that 
coworker effects may be stronger in the integrated workplace than in the segregated workplace, 
and that inter-network competition in the integrated workplace may lead to better overall 
performance in the integrated workplace than in the segregated workplace.
17
                                                        
17 Charness and Villeval (2009), based on new experimental evidence, draws a similar implication for 
the advantage of workplace diversity in the context of mixing senior with junior workers. In addition, Kurtulus 
(2011) uses subjective evaluations of individual workers as performance measures and provide evidence for 
the performance-enhancing effect of workplace diversity in terms of gender, narrowly-defined tenure within 
division, education and wage.        
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Appendix: Random assignment 
Since weavers do not switch teams, their predicted abilities also include team fixed effects, for 
instance as the different teams may be producing different textile products. Thus, we cannot 
identify whether a more able worker is assigned to a more able team, as the abilities are 
measured on different scales across the teams. We can, however, test whether a high-ability 
weaver is working with other high-ability teammates at any given time.  
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) point out that the typical estimate of regressing 
the teammates' average ability at time t on one's own ability is biased downward, for one cannot 
be assigned to herself. In other words, the pool of peers that the teammates at time t are drawn 
from have a lower average ability for a high-ability focal worker than for a low-ability worker, as 
the focal worker is excluded from the otherwise identical pool. The bias is more severe when the 
pool is small. Following the bias-correction method in Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009), 
we run the following regression: 
(A1) ait= π0 + π1a -i + π2 (a -it - a -i) + team fixed effects + υit 
where ait is the predicted ability in defect rate of weaver i who shows up in week t, a -it is the 
average ability of her teammates who are actually working with weaver i in week t, and a -i is the 
average ability of all of weaver i’s teammates including those not working in week t (in other 
words, counting any weaver who works with weaver i at least one time during the time period 
under study). By construction, ai = α N - a -i(N-1) where α  is the average ability of the whole 
team including weaver i and N is the total number of weavers in the team, counting any weaver 
who works with weaver i in the same team for at least one week during the time period under 
study) Thus π1 should be close to the mean of -(N-1). We calculated N for each of the 18 teams 
from the data, which turned out to be around 16. Hence, π1 should be about -15. The coefficient 27 
 
π2 indicates whether more able workers are matched with other more able teammates at time t, 
holding the average ability of the pool that the teammates are drawn from constant. The null 
hypothesis of random assignment means that π2 is zero. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table A1 present the regression results. As expected, π1 is 
significant at the 1 percent level and close to -15, and more importantly we cannot reject the null 
that π2=0, supporting our field observation that there is random assignment. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of week fixed effects. In sum, the random assignment test turned out to 
support our field observation that there is random assignment. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  N 
DefRateit (percent)  0.239  0.181  9966 
DayOutit (in 10 meters)  54.555  18.285  9966 
Days Workedit  6.271  0.88  9966 
Wageit  148.136  30.369  9966 
Femalei  0.969  0.175  287 
Rurali  0.666  0.473  287 
Team Sizejt  10.458  2.481  953 
Source: All data provided by SCT. 
Notes: See text for variable definitions. Subscripts i, j, and t indicate weaver i, team j, and week t.   
Since no weaver switched teams during the time period under study, variations in Team Sizejt come   




Table 2 Relationship between performance measures and weekly wages: Dep=Wageit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
DefRateit  -9.946***  -9.247***  -10.260***  -9.466*** 
  (3.54)  (3.50)  (3.65)  (3.57) 
DayOutit  0.079***  0.078***  0.086***  0.083*** 
  (3.29)  (3.39)  (3.44)  (3.46) 
Days Workedit  24.816***  24.632***  24.912***  24.770*** 
  (49.73)  (47.74)  (48.94)  (47.18) 
Outperforming Teammates' Avg DefRateit  6.768***  6.446***  6.776***  6.461*** 
  (10.79)  (11.23)  (10.86)  (11.30) 
Outperforming Teammates' Avg DayOutit  0.402  0.424  0.335  0.400 
  (0.63)  (0.68)  (0.52)  (0.63) 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.734  0.751  0.733  0.750 
N  9961  9961  9961  9961 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: See text for variable definitions. Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are 
robust and clustered at the individual level. All models include individual fixed effects as well as 
the following controls: Teammates' Avg DefRateit (mean of weaver i’ teammates’ DefRate); 
Teammates' Avg DayOutit (mean of weaver i’ teammates’ DayOut); planned DayOut for weaver i in 
week t, and the number of all weavers working in the same team as weaver i in week t.   
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01   
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Table 3 Coworker effects: Dep=∆DefRateit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Δa -it  0.273  0.270  0.333**  0.323** 
  (1.59)  (1.40)  (1.97)  (2.13) 
ΔDayOutit  -0.004***  -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (15.85)  (19.02)  (18.67)  (18.62) 
Demand control  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.075  0.096  0.119  0.112 
N  9009  9009  9009  9009 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: a -it is the average ability of weaver i’s teammates in week t. See text for the remaining 
variable definitions. Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are robust; 
clustered at the individual level; and adjusted to take into account the sampling variability of 
the estimated fixed effects for coworkers, following Mas and Moretti (2009). All models 
include individual fixed effects and Δ(teammates’ average effort).  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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 Table 4 Coworker effects and social networks: Dep=∆DefRateit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Δa -igt  0.086  0.091  0.104  0.077 
  (1.10)  (1.06)  (1.21)  (0.87) 
Δa -i-gt  0.279***  0.256***  0.248***  0.245*** 
  (3.31)  (2.99)  (2.86)  (2.67) 
ΔDayOutit  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (15.90)  (19.29)  (17.90)  (18.67) 
Demand control  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.075  0.096  0.119  0.112 
N  9009  9009  9009  9009 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: a -igt is the average ability of weaver i’s ingroup teammates in week t and a -i-gt is the 
average ability of weaver i’s outgroup teammates in week t. See text for the remaining 
variable definitions. Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are robust; 
clustered at the individual level; and adjusted to take into account the sampling variability of 
the estimated fixed effects for coworkers, following Mas and Moretti (2009). All models 
include individual fixed effects and Δ(teammates’ average effort).  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 Coworker effects and social networks: sample=rural migrant workers; Dep=∆DefRateit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Δa -igt  0.103  0.141  0.121  0.055 
  (1.12)  (1.45)  (1.27)  (0.54) 
Δa -i-gt  0.241***  0.189**  0.178**  0.171* 
  (2.88)  (2.24)  (2.01)  (1.76) 
ΔDayOutit  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (13.47)  (15.54)  (15.31)  (16.20) 
Demand control  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.061  0.079  0.099  0.088 
N  5511  5511  5511  5511 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: a -igt is the average ability of weaver i’s ingroup teammates in week t and a -i-gt is the 
average ability of weaver i’s outgroup teammates in week t. See text for the remaining 
variable definitions. Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are robust; 
clustered at the individual level; and adjusted to take into account the sampling variability of 
the estimated fixed effects for coworkers, following Mas and Moretti (2009). All models 
include individual fixed effects and Δ(teammates’ average effort).  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 33 
 
Table 6 Coworker effects and social networks: sample=urban resident workers; Dep=∆DefRateit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Δa -igt  0.113  0.073  0.165  0.161 
  (0.79)  (0.53)  (1.17)  (0.95) 
Δa -i-gt  0.268  0.343  0.345  0.391* 
  (1.31)  (1.58)  (1.62)  (1.77) 
ΔDayOutit  -0.004***  -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (8.59)  (11.13)  (10.41)  (10.14) 
Demand control  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.092  0.114  0.155  0.129 
N  3312  3312  3312  3312 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: a -igt is the average ability of weaver i’s ingroup teammates in week t and a -i-gt is the 
average ability of weaver i’s outgroup teammates in week t. See text for the remaining variable 
definitions. Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are robust; clustered at the 
individual level; and adjusted to take into account the sampling variability of the estimated fixed 
effects for coworkers, following Mas and Moretti (2009). All models include individual fixed 
effects and Δ(teammates’ average effort).  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table A1 Random assignment within a team: Dep= ait 
  (1)  (2) 
a -i  -14.796***  -14.792*** 
  (48.94)  (48.74) 
a -i - a -it  0.003  -0.005 
  (0.32)  (0.54) 
Week FE   No  Yes 
Team FE   Yes  Yes 
Adj.R-squared  0.998  0.998 
N  9961  9961 
Source: All data provided by SCT.  
Notes: a -it is the average ability of weaver i’s teammates in week t. a -i is the average ability of all of weaver i’s 
teammates including those not working in week t (in other words, counting any weaver who works with weaver i at 
least one time during the time period under study). Absolute values of t are in parentheses. All standard errors are 
robust and clustered at the team level.  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 